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Chapter Nine
On the Resilience of Superstition 
João de Pina-Cabral
KL
Modernity, like modern science, could live with everything except an attenu-
ated status and a limited, non-proselytizing social role for it.
—Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy
Anthropologists and philosophers have always taken very seriously the con-
cept of ‘belief’ or croyance. Nevertheless, it has led to a long series of perplexi-
ties that do not seem to be fully resolved even today, nearly forty years after 
Rodney Needham published his fundamental essay on the topic (Needham 
1972). On the other hand, the concept of ‘superstition’ as used by the fathers 
of anthropology (e.g. Frazer 1909) has simply been discarded as ethnocen-
tric. The first has been pushed aside for its logical uncertainty, the second 
for its ethical uncertainty.  
Yet the two concepts are surprisingly resilient, and they remain related 
by the fact  that belief  (as  in  ‘the so-and-so believe this and that’)  is gener-
ally used to mean the knowledge of others to which the speaker does not 
adhere; that is, others’ unfounded beliefs. As most commonly used, there-
fore, the category of belief implies the suppressed category of superstition, 
much like the common anthropological category ‘the Other’ – with capital 
‘o’ –  implies  the suppressed category of  the  ‘primitive’. Furthermore,  this 
association is definitional: superstition is defined as ‘unfounded belief’, but 
the issue of the foundation of belief is at the centre of the anthropological 
and philosophical perplexities that have recently haunted epistemological 
thinking (see Toren and Pina-Cabral 2009; Fabian 2012: 444).
In this chapter, we will engage one of the oldest themes in anthropology: 
the efficacy of magic. As in previous essays, I will depend on Donald Da-
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vidson’s epistemological views that amount to a type of minimalist realism 
and are essentially non-representationalist (Davidson 2001: 138). I will use 
as examples two instances of magic: one taken from the early work of Joseph 
Conrad, the other from a news report concerning the common-law wife of 
the late writer Stieg Larsson.
Unwinding Participation
These examples fully evoke Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of ‘participation’ as 
developed in his late personal notes, the Carnets, published posthumously in 
1949 (Lévy-Bruhl 1998). For Lévy-Bruhl, the word describes the fact that ‘the 
“primitive” frequently experiences participations between himself and this 
or that environing being or object, natural or supernatural, with which he is 
or comes to be in contact, and that, quite as frequently, he imagines similar 
participations between these beings and objects’ (ibid.: 77–78).1 He observes, 
‘individual beings or objects are only represented within a whole of which 
they are, if not the parts, at least integrating elements, composing elements 
(les composants), or reproductions’ (ibid.: 22). Lévy-Bruhl’s editor further clari-
fies by explaining that what Lévy-Bruhl had observed was that, ‘the beings 
and objects which are associated in collective representations only reach 
representation on the basis of a link that makes them always already partici-
pating in one another, so that one can claim that this link is felt even before 
these objects have been represented and related to each other as represented 
objects’ (Karsenti 1998: xxiv).
Now, many anthropologists today are highly sceptical of the apposite-
ness  of  the  notion  of  ‘representation’  (Toren  1999;  Pina-Cabral  2010a). 
Davidson himself was a critic (Davidson 2001: 34), and the issue has been 
causing much debate of late (e.g. Clark 1996; Mandik and Clark 2002; 
Chemero 2009; Siegel 2011). Whatever the outcome of these discussions in 
light of any further scientific evidence that might surface concerning human 
mental functions, we can be certain that the way anthropologists have been 
using the notion of representation in the twentieth century (collective and 
individual) is today a major hindrance to anthropological theorizing (see 
Giddens 1996: 124). 
In particular, notions like ‘representation’ and ‘belief’ operate a kind of 
silent compacting between personal dispositions (aspects of thought held in 
the mind of each one of us) and collective dispositions (statistical tenden-
cies observed among the mental dispositions of members of a group). To 
presume that personal mental processes (representations) and collectively 
shared dispositions (collective representations) are somehow phenomena of 
 On the Resilience of Superstition 175
the same nature is to presume that groups have minds of the same nature 
as persons – a presupposition that we are hardly entitled to make. Our chal-
lenge,  then,  is  to  find  a way  of matching Lévy-Bruhl’s  profound  insights 
concerning human thinking with contemporary epistemology, where the no-
tion of representation as enshrined in the anthropological tradition is best 
avoided and where unstated isomorphisms between personal mental pro-
cesses and collective tendencies are decidedly untenable. 
I believe that we can do this by proposing that Lévy-Bruhl’s notion of 
‘participation’ synthesizes various aspects of the human condition that we 




are constituted multiply and relationally, all singularity being approximate 
and evanescent. Marilyn Strathern’s concept of the ‘dividual person’ helps 
us understand how plurality is anterior to singularity, always reimposing 
itself (Strathern 1988; see also Mosko 2010; Pina-Cabral 2010b). Strathern’s 
connected notion of ‘partibility’ describes objects and persons as mutually 





towards the better understanding of the epistemology of everyday life in-
spired by the late work of Wittgenstein – namely, an approach to category 
formation that emphasizes the way in which concepts in natural languages 
are not subject to the rules of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, 
rather relying on a notion of opposition that remains ever incomplete and 
approximate, and on unmediated notions of causality.2 The way in which 
cognition  is essentially embodied  is an aspect of Needham’s  thought  that 
has come to be fully confirmed, three decades later, by the work of neuro-
physiologists and philosophers of cognition, such as Clark and Chalmers 
(1995) and Chemero (2009), or of vision, such as Siegel (2011). In Needham 
words: ‘the principle of opposition is reversible direction; and (directional) 
opposites are based on  the spatial experience of  the human body’  (Need-
ham 1987: 71–72). His argument concerning notions of causality similarly 
stresses the relationship between cognition and embodiment (Needham 
1983: 66–92). Whilst many of the insights of Claude Lévi-Strauss in The Sav-
age Mind (1966) concerning bricolage must be taken as an inspiration to all 
of these discussions, his general structuralist epistemology will have to be 
abandoned, as indeed Needham had come to realize by the time he wrote 
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Counterpoints (1987). In fact, category formation will be approached by us in 
much the same way that fuzzy logic does when it exploits the tolerance for 
imprecision in dealing with complex problems of engineering (Pina-Cabral 
2010a; Ross 2010 [1995]). 
The  third  aspect  concerns  the  nature  of  human  communication. We 
start from a realist posture that emphasizes the essentially veridical nature 
of belief: as Quine put  it,  ‘to believe  is  to believe true’  (Quine and Ullian 
1970: 4). A necessary condition for successful interpretation, therefore, ac-
cording to Davidson,  is  that  ‘the  interpreter must so  interpret as to make 
a  speaker or agent  largely  correct about  the world’  (Davidson 2001: 152). 
However, whilst the constitution of belief is essentially veridical in that it de-
pends formatively on people’s assessment of what might be the case, one of 
its characteristics is the proneness to favour greater belief coherence. Here 
again, therefore, we are in a graded situation rather than one dominated 
by clear-cut binary opposites. Concerning belief, therefore, the rule of the 
excluded middle  also makes no  sense. Thus,  ostensivity –  that  is,  the  as-
sociation of heard words with things simultaneously observed – is indeed 
the boundary condition of belief, but it is often sidetracked by the need for 
belief coherence, giving rise to retentivity – that is, the tendency for beliefs 
to interconnect with each other, tending towards systematicity (without ever 
actually  fully achieving  it). As Quine puts  it,  ‘We form habits of building 
beliefs such as we form our other habits; only in habits of building beliefs 
there is less room for idiosyncrasy’ (Quine and Ullian 1970: 59).  Retentivity 
consolidates over time in processes of collective coherence that, when identi-
fied by ethnographers, get called ‘world-views’. 
This is one of the conclusions reached by Gustav Jahoda in his extensive 
study of the category of superstition carried out nearly half a century ago 
(Jahoda 1970). The experience of meaning is relational and holistic – there 
is no such thing as an individual belief, as all beliefs are dependent on other 
beliefs. Humans are prone towards favouring the maximization of meaning, 
so retentivity and the constitution of world-views are instruments of that. 
Now, the two examples that I will discuss are cases where the efficacy 
of the procedures was independent of what Lévy-Bruhl would have called 
croyance  (belief).  That  is,  if  asked whether  they  ‘believed  in’  the  objective 
powers of the magic they are practising, most of the participants in these 
two cases would have denied it. Yet, they all experienced and reported the 
efficacy of the magic, and they were all emotionally affected by the events. 
We are, therefore, invited to rethink the category of ‘belief’, separating very 
clearly between, on the one hand, the propositional attitudes that were being 
entertained – that is, what Malcolm Ruel (2002 [1982]) would have called 
‘believing that’– and, on the other hand, the adherence to a collective world 
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implied  in  the  entertaining  of  such  propositional  attitudes  –  that  is,  ‘be-
lieving in’, or fideistic belief, to use Sabbatucci’s favoured expression (Sab-
batucci 2000; see also Pompa 2003).
Finally, in order to avoid challenging the Cartesian epistemology that 
ruled his day, Lévy-Bruhl had to harbour himself within the safe walls of the 
notion of the ‘primitive’. Much as, later on in life, he added considerable nu-
ance to his position in order to safeguard the essential unity of the human 
mind (e.g. Lévy-Bruhl 1998: 60), he remained bound by an ‘us/them’ polar-
ity which meant he need not question the essential aspects of the Kantian 
status quo of his day.4 Today, however, the notion that we might be examin-
ing some form of culturally specific or non-Western mode of thinking is to-
tally beside the point. In fact, as I hope to show, the examples I have chosen 
are clear evidence of this. In short, we are led to abandon the primitivist 
disposition that continues to hide itself behind culturalist fashion in anthro-
pology (Pina-Cabral and Lydell 2009). The phenomena of effectiveness that 
we observe in these charms have broadly universal reach. 
In light of this, therefore, I will suggest below that we might usefully 
recover  the much-maligned  anthropological  notion  of  ‘superstition’.  This 
would  then be defined not  as  ‘unfounded belief’  but  as  the proneness of 
human beings anywhere to constitute their informal worlds in terms of mu-
tuality of personhood, polythetic thinking and retentiveness of belief.
Conrad’s Magic
Joseph Conrad’s early fiction is situated around the coves and estuaries of 
the island-strewn coast of Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo (then known as the 
Eastern Archipelago: see Harrison 1970). It is a region he came to know very 
well during his maritime days, and for whose inhabitants he came to feel 
a distinct form of empathy. This is Conrad’s ‘East’, a concept that plays a 
central part in his emotional economy during the contrastingly sedate days 
spent in Kent, writing vast quantities of fiction. It is equally important in the 
reception of his work by the numberless avid readers who, such as myself, 
find  it hard  to  tear  themselves  away  from Conrad’s fiction. As he puts  it 
vividly at the end of Youth: ‘This was the East of the ancient navigators, so 
old, so mysterious, resplendent and sombre, living and unchanged, full of 
danger and promise’ (Conrad 2011: 64).
The stories of the early books tend be mutually linked and, as we read 
on, we get a sense of meeting the same contexts and characters again and 
again: gun running against the Dutch; a relation between Europeans and lo-
cals that is a mixture of mutual fear and fascination; the tragic ambivalence 
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of mixed people, mixed love and mixed friendship; the ups and downs of 
naval companionship; the marvels of British imperial power, and so on. One 
of the last pieces of Conrad’s early period is a short story called ‘Karain, A 
Memory’ (Conrad 2012: 13–93), apparently related to a context with which 
he was very familiar and that, according to him, he repeated unwittingly in 
another story in the same collection, ‘The Lagoon’ (ibid.: 314–69). It is about 
a band of three gun-runners that strike up a friendship with a local poten-
tate: a handsome man of fascinating presence, thoroughly respected in his 
small domain, whose back is permanently protected by an armed sorcerer. 
One day, the sorcerer dies of old age and the chieftain falls into terrible 
disarray. He is paralysed by fear of his ghostly enemies. He is at the point of 
losing the small kingdom he carved out for himself by means of sheer mili-
tary prowess. His loving followers are stunned and bereft.
A tropical storm is upon the Europeans’ boat, moored in the middle of 
the cove. They have not managed to see Karain, and this puzzles them, as 
they had struck up a genuine friendship with the fellow. Having carried out 
their business, they are preparing to leave but are held back by the brutal-
ity of the squall. To their surprise, out of the rain, the chieftain jumps into 
their boat. He is almost naked and carries nothing but his kris, having swum 
alone from the shore in cover of darkness. He is terrified and exhausted.
As the storm unfolds, he tells them his story: their family had sent him 
and his best friend on a revenge mission to kill a woman who had run away 
with a Dutch man, breaking a marriage agreement that had been agreed to 
by the elders, thus besmirching their ancestors’ honour. Theirs was a long 
and arduous pilgrimage that took years until they found her. Finally, one 
morning, when the time had come to kill them, Karain spoiled the act of 
rightful vengeance by aiming his gun at his friend instead of at the woman’s 
Dutch culprit. During the long and painful years of their search, without 
even being aware of it, Karain had fallen blindly in love with the image of 
her. He wanted nothing from her, but her death had become an impossibil-
ity for him. 
Left alone and having no way back home, Karain is forced to confront 
the horror of his betrayal, but he finds protection in the magical powers of 
this  sorcerer. Thus, he manages  to direct his  tremendous energy  towards 
conquering a new home, his little seaside realm. Now that the sorcerer was 
dead, however, he was again at the mercy of his ghosts or, in any case, of his 
guilt. He begs to be taken to England, where the ghosts will not follow him 
as no one in England believes in them. But his European friends know only 
too well that this is hardly the case, that it will not bring solace; it will only 
postpone his self-destruction. One of them, called Hollis, suddenly, has an 
idea. He takes out of the boat’s trunk his own personal box and opens it:
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There were there a couple of reels of cotton, a packet of needles, a bit of silk 
ribbon, dark blue; a cabinet photograph, at which Hollis stole a glance before 
laying it on the table face downwards. A girl’s portrait, I could see. There were, 
amongst a lot of various small objects, a bunch of flowers, a narrow white glove 
with many buttons, a slim packet of letters carefully tied up. Amulets of white 
men! Charms and talismans! Charms that keep them straight, that drive them 
crooked, that have the power to make a young man sigh, an old man smile. 
Potent things that procure dreams of joy, thoughts of regret; that soften hard 
hearts, and can temper a soft one to the hardness of steel. Gifts of heaven – 
things of earth. (ibid.: 79)
Then, as Hollis rummages through his box, Conrad lets us know:
All the ghosts driven out of the unbelieving West by men who pretend to be 
wise and alone and at peace – all the homeless ghosts of an unbelieving world 
– appeared suddenly round the figure of Hollis bending over the box … [T]hey 
all seemed to come from the inhospitable regions of the earth to crowd into the 
gloomy cabin, as though it had been a refuge and, in all the unbelieving world, 
the only place of avenging belief … It lasted a second – all disappeared. (ibid.)





had cherished for so long that the owner would no longer be waiting for his 
return; he sews it into a bag and ties it with the blue ribbon that the glove’s 
owner had given him at his already distant departure from some English 
dock. Finally, he imposed it on Karain, crying out loud a spell: ‘Forget, and 
be at peace!’








both his arms, then pointed to the infallible charm. We cheered again; and 
the Malays in the boats stared – very much puzzled and impressed. I won-
dered what they thought; what he thought; … what the reader thinks?’ (ibid.: 
88). Now, precisely the matter of the reader’s opinion concerning the power 
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of the charm and of the ghosts seems to be the point of the story. What is, 




Many years later, the narrator meets by chance the third of his gun-run-
ner companions in Piccadilly. They had not seen each other for more than a 
decade, and both had abandoned their naval nomadism. Soon after greeting 
each other, the now retired sailor asks the narrator (Conrad?): 
I wonder whether the charm worked – you remember Hollis’ charm, of course. 
If it did … Never was a sixpence wasted to better advantage! Poor devil! I won-
der whether he got rid of that friend of his. Hope so … Do you know, I some-
times think that […] whether the thing was so, you know … whether it really 
happened to him … What do you think?’ (ibid.: 91)
The narrator tries to distract his old partner’s imagination by pointing 
to the palpable, modern carriage that is passing by them in all of its modern 
pomp in central London. The old sailor replies: ‘Yes; I see it. […] It is there; 










ultimate message to his readers is the musing over the frighteningly deadly 
powers of Karain’s childhood friend and their ancestors, who had been rely-
ing on the act of vengeance to clear their honour but were wronged. 





of human universality in the face of human diversity (ibid.: 79).
Firstly, we are shown to be all equally subject to the mutuality of person-
hood – in Karain’s case, he is subjected to his distant ghosts and he is also 
a plaything of love. The same, however, is the case with Hollis, his healer, 
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whose ghosts too come to visit the boat in that stormy night, even if only mo-
mentarily, when he opens his case. Secondly, we are subject to overlapping 
modes of thinking. There is difference, all right; but there is sufficient over-
lap for communication to occur. Even if we are not too certain what goes on 
in Karain’s mind, we too know how to operate with analogies by means of 
error assessment in modes which are akin to the systems of control based on 
fuzzy logic. Conrad plays on the way in which Karain’s and Hollis’s worlds 
overlap  significantly,  in  all  of  their difference. But he  is  so  certain of  the 
proximity that he can even joke with the reader, knowing full well what the 
reader is feeling, thus challenging the reader’s predictable surprise. Finally, 
even though we come from different backgrounds, we recognize the modes 
of ‘participation’ among the various parts of our mutual worlds, we can rely 
on retentivity to act upon us – even if, at the end, we feel obliged to leave 
behind a kind of ironic disclaimer.
Postmodern Charms
Stieg Larsson, the Danish author of the fabulously successful trilogy Mil-
lennium (Larsson 2010), died intestate of a sudden disease. Shortly after his 
death, it became clear that his novels would yield untold riches. His com-
mon-law wife, Eva Gabrielsson, who by all accounts had helped him write 
his novels, was left out of the inheritance, which was claimed exclusively by 
his father and brother with whom he had a distant relationship. Her anger 
and the public feeling of injustice led her to write a book about her travails 
that has been well received (2011). The Herald Tribune published an interview 
with her about the book where it is related that:
Ms Gabrielsson … talked forthrightly about the oddest passage in her book, 










that  ‘all  the people who have profited  from Stieg  in his  lifetime –  they have 
not fared well. Bad things happen to them. I don’t want to attribute that to the 
curse, but they are in trouble’.5
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Again we meet with the same puzzlingly contradictory disclaim of belief 
– what would be the point of telling the story, if the curse had not been ef-
fective? Furthermore, one might be satisfied with the effect the curse had on 
those who made it, but we are told in no uncertain terms that it had broader 
and even dire effects. Ms Gabrielsson does not ‘believe in’ the curse, for her 
world-view would not have allowed her to claim that association, but she 
does ‘believe that’ the curse is operative since this curse is a central part of 
her own reconstruction of her world after bereavement.
In fact, the journalist (and, by implication, the Herald Tribune) joins her 




ous category of primitiveness; here, it is Viking rituals re-enacted in their 
original locus but at a distance of many centuries. 
Again we find the same processes of ‘participation’ we found above. In 
her capacity to reconstitute herself and harm her enemies, there is creative 
imagination at work. It depends, firstly, on the partibility of those who, hav-
ing depended on Stieg Larsson, can now be affected by the curse. Secondly, 
it uses processes of fuzzy logic that are synthetic and not analytical, and that 
rely on incomplete oppositions. Finally, it depends on the retentive aspects 
of belief that integrate contemporary Swedish notions of collective being by 
making use of the image of Vikings and of the urban lake.
Conclusion: On the Resilience of Superstition
Let us go further back to the origin of this discussion, as we will find that 
much more hangs on the notion of superstition than the emotional impact 
of a few quaint charms. In his book Psyche’s Task: A Discourse Concerning the In-
fluence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions (1909), Sir James Frazer writes 
in defence of superstition: ‘among certain races and at certain stages of evo-
lution some social institutions which we all, or most of us, believe to be ben-
eficial have partially rested on a bases of superstition’ (Frazer 1909: 1). His 




too, like Lévy-Bruhl, when confronted with the actual evidence, had great 
difficulty in precisely pinpointing the boundaries of primitiveness. But note 
how interesting are his chosen examples: government, property, marriage 
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and the respect for human life – the four basic pillars of bourgeois human-
ism. If these are essentially ‘superstitions’, then what is not?
Frazer was  inspired by Westermarck’s  thoughts on superstition  (ibid.: 
27). The latter found that superstition is the very basis of morality, even in 
modern society:
in serving the cause of avarice and ambition[, superstition] subserved the cause 
of civilization, by fostering conceptions of the right of property and the sanctity 
of the marriage tie – conceptions which in time grew strong enough to stand 
by themselves and to fling away the crutch of superstition which in earlier days 
had been their sole support. For we shall scarcely err in believing that even in 
advanced societies the moral sentiments, in so far as they are merely sentiments 
and are not based on an induction from experience, derive much of their force 
from an original system of taboo. Thus on the taboo were grafted the golden 
fruits of law and morality, while the parent stem dwindled slowly into the sour 
crabs and empty husks of popular superstition on which the swine of modern 
society are still content to feed. (Westermarck 1908: 59)
Superstition, then, for these already distant ancestors, is unfounded be-
lief – but unfounded in the sense of irrational and incoherent, not in the 
sense of wrong or inadequate to live by. Their point is precisely that, whilst 




human life and, therefore, is simple and anterior – allowed them to contem-
plate the evidence that Lévy-Bruhl would later also confront: that human 
behaviour could not satisfactorily be described by adhering to formal logic 
and rational evidence as it was then seen. Today, we can no longer be satis-
fied with that strategy, however. We have discovered that we are all dividual 
persons, whose unchecked processes of everyday thinking follow a kind of 







decisively. If that is the case, then, the suppressed category of superstition 
need no longer be taboo to anthropological mouths. What made it a dirty 
word was the implication of primitiveness and human inferiority. Once this 
is abandoned, it can satisfactorily be used to describe the quandaries con-
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cerning belief that have not ceased to disturb us to this day. Just over a 
century ago, Conrad saw himself obliged to engage in irony to report the 
fact that the processes he was identifying in Karain’s story were, in fact, fully 
applicable to his ‘modern’ world. Just the other day, Eva Gabrielsson found 
it useful again to take recourse to very similar processes for very similar 
reasons. If, instead of being seen as failings, these were seen as processes 
that permanently characterize our human condition, then we would not be 
obliged to engage in the sort of denial of belief that characterized both Con-
rad’s and Eva Gabrielsson’s narratives. 
Finally, the evidence that Frazer and Westermarck unearthed that some 
of the central institutions of social living depend on processes that Lévy-
Bruhl would call ‘participation’ need not be formulated in primitivist terms. 
If, then, we are willing to engage frontally with the mutuality of personhood, 
polythetic modes of thinking and retentivity in belief, we have no reason to 
avoid speaking of superstition to describe such modes of thinking, and to 
differentiate them from the modes of analytical thinking that have devel-
oped over the years for the purpose of the constitution of scientific and tech-
nical knowledge (and which we find almost impossible to apply thoroughly, 
try as we might, to our everyday engagement with things and people). 
Having thoroughly examined the literature available in the mid twen-
tieth century, Gustav Jahoda ends his essay on the psychology of supersti-
tion with a critique of those who continued to believe that education and 
the improvement of science will lead to a decrease in what was then called 
‘superstition’. He concluded, therefore, ‘opinions of this kind are themselves 
irrational in nature’, and ‘the propensity can never be eradicated because, 
paradoxically, it is an integral part of mechanisms without which humanity 
would be unable to survive’ (Jahoda 1970: 142, 147). Jahoda is not all that 





as the normal mode of human engagement with the world. Rather, they 
must be seen as the exception – mediated by a series of methodological 
technologies that have been developed precisely to help us sustain that ex-
ception. Superstition, on the contrary, must be seen as the more frequent 
mode of engaging our social worlds and constructing ourselves as persons.
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Notes
 1. All translations from non-English language texts cited in the bibliography are 
my own.
 2. On polythetic categories and causality, see Needham (1983); on opposition, see 
Needham (1987).
 3. Faced with this quote by Quine, readers often want to know why there might be 
less space for idiosyncrasy in belief than in other habits. I think that, when he 
wrote this, Quine was thinking of the holism of belief, that is, the way in which 




the supernatural also applies to Christianity (Lévy-Bruhl 1998: 68–69). We can 
judge how difficult this issue continues to be for anthropology by the fact that 
Needham’s argument in his essay ‘Skulls and Causality’ (Needham 1983: 66–
92) is still hard reading today.
  5.  ‘A Portrait of Stieg Larsson, By She Who Knew Him Best’, Herald Tribune, 23 
June 2011.
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